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Consider the following situation: Alice is a hand-held device, such as a PDA.
Bob is a device providing a service, such as an ATM, an automatic door, or an
anti-aircraft gun pointing at the gyro-copter in which Alice is travelling.
Bob and Alice have never directly met before, but share a key as a result of
secure hand-offs. Alice has used this key to request a service from Bob (dispense
cash, open door, don’t shoot). Before complying, Bob needs to be sure that it
really is Alice that he can see in front of him, and not Mort.
Mort and her accomplice Cove are planning a wormhole attack along classic
man-in-the-middle lines. They wait until Alice is in a situation where she expects
to be challenged by Bob, and then Mort pretends to Bob that she is Alice, while
Cove pretends to Alice that he is Bob.
Mort and Cove relay the appropriate challenges and responses to one another
over a channel hidden from Alice and Bob, in order to allow the dual masquerade
to succeed, following which Alice waits impatiently in front of a different ATM,
or the wrong door, or another gun.
How can such an attack be prevented? Obviously it suffices if Alice and
Bob both have a secure way of identifying their (relative) location to sufficient
accuracy. But how can they do this?
Suppose that we could enclose Bob inside a Platonic Faraday cage, which
blocks all information-bearing signals, not just the RF ones. At the end of the
protocol run, Bob could be confident that Alice was also inside the Faraday cage.
Provided the Platonic Faraday cage was of sufficiently small size and shape to
satisfy the appropriate proximity requirement, Bob could proceed.
One way of providing such a Platonic Faraday cage is to use the laws of
physics: for example distance-bounding protocols use the fact that the speed of
light is finite3.
In this position paper, we argue that the laws of information theory can be
used instead. The key insight is that it doesn’t matter if the Platonic Faraday
cage leaks some information4, provided the amount of information that Mort
and Cove need to exchange is greater.
Previous work in this direction has relied upon restricting the rate at which
Mort and Cove can communicate, essentially using a variant of covert channel
analysis to reduce the rate of leakage. We propose the converse approach, using
Ultra Wide Band (UWB) lasers to transfer so much information from Bob to
3 Although there is some doubt in the case of entanglement: imagine a Josephson
junction 30m wide changing state.
4 Even Plato allowed for some information leakage.
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the location where he believes Alice to be that only a fraction of it could be
relayed by Mort.
The real Alice knows where to look for the crucial signal bits, which are
hidden at different time and wavelength positions according to a pseudo-random
series seeded by the shared key, but Mort is stymied.
The use of UWB is widespread at microwave frequency bands, but we believe
the use of it in visible light spectrum (where the information packing density
is higher) to be novel. The continuous pulse rate is high (Pbps) and the power
is very low. Normally in UWB receiver and transmitter are matched. Here the
objective is that they should be deliberately mis-matched, with the transmitter
sending more pulses than it is possible for the receiver to distinguish.
Consequently, by the Nyquist-Shannon Theorem (Signal to Noise Ratio ver-
sion), a receiver who does not know precisely which pulses to capture will be
unable to capture more than a small proportion of them. Effectively the attacker
cannot relay the whole side-channel signal without amplifying the noise to the
point where the signal is undecipherable. The beam contains too much infor-
mation for a feasible transponder array to re-broadcast, and cannot be reflected
using known mechanical or optical means.
This makes the proposed UWB laser approach ideal for use outdoors: simul-
taneous use of two5 narrow beam directional lasers from different positions on a
baseline of suitable direction and length allows the position of a remote object
to be accurately determined in three dimensional space.
In contrast, although the use of multiple simultaneous distance bounding
protocols allows triangulation within the convex hull of the base points6, objects
cannot be located outside the convex hull with the distance bounding technique.
At the other extreme, on the small (tabletop) scale, the use of a single UWB
laser allows a Platonic Faraday cage to be provided by a cardboard box.
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